

Salvaging the European Union: The Inclusive Multi-Track Supranational Option

Steven, Rosefielde

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Department of Economics
stevenr@email.unc.edu

Abstract

The EU has many supranational accomplishments to its credit. Frictions nonetheless exist within the EU because some members want to rollback parts of the consensus (“less Europe”) and others want to expand them (“more Europe”). The conflict cannot be amicably resolved as EU leaders are trying to do in a one-track supranational regime because both factions disagree about whether confederation or federation is best. A solution in a one-track system requires one side to capitulate to the other. This is why the EU is at an impasse. However, the conflict is easily resolved by switching from a one-track to a multi-track supranational system that allows advocates of “more Europe” and “less Europe” to do as they like in some areas, while acting collectively wherever consensus permits. The EU already accepts the multi-track principle with regard to the euro and non-euro zones, and could restore harmony to the European project by applying the principle more broadly.

Keywords: EU, Supranationality, one-track supranationality, multi-track supranationality

JEL Classification: E02, E52, E61, F36, H63, H77, O52, P11, P17

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is coming unglued (Dallago, 2016, a,b,c; Dallago 2018; Dallago, Guri and McGowan, 2016; Dallago and Rosefielde, 2018; Gretschmann, 2016; Piattoni, 2016). The United Kingdom will secede from the EU on 29 March 2019 (Brexit). Political leaders in Greece, the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Czechia are contemplating following suit, and secessionist sentiment is building in Scotland, North Ireland, Catalonia, Basque, Lombardy and Veneto.

EU leaders know this (European Commission, 2017; European Union, 2017; European Commission, 2017; European Council, 2017). They have been working hard to salvage the union by offering more generous debt relief to distressed members like Greece, and by making it easier for Eurozone participants to obtain cash from the European Central Bank. They also have taken a hard negotiating position on Brexit to deter copycats. These steps are sound, but monetary, fiscal and the “single market” policies are only tips of the iceberg. The UK did not leave the EU because its economy was underperforming (Dallago and Rosefielde, 2018). A myriad of grievances that EU authorities refuse to confront, including Brussels’ intrusive bureaucratic over-regulation and unrestricted intra-union labor migration drove Brexit.

The EU evolved from an economic community (Treaty of Rome 1958) into a political union that transferred government authority from member states to supranational institutions. The alliance started as a weak economic confederation based on shared universal principles, but moved steadily toward a strong federation (Lisbon Agreement) with Germany and France pushing further for a “super-state” akin to the United States of America (Rosefielde, 2018).

Proponents of a super-state argue for “more Europe”; opponents urge “less Europe” giving the false impression that factional preferences turn on the comparative merit of ideal federal and confederative institutions. This dichotomy is trebly misleading. First, it erroneously implies that federalism or confederation is intrinsically superior. Programming theory established long ago that federal and confederative institutions both permit ideal solutions in principle (Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow, 1958). Second, it disregards the possibility of sophisticated multi-track systems featuring a federal structure that allows different classes of membership each permitted to choose strong or weak integration under a common supranational umbrella. Third, it diverts attention from substantive issues of culture, power and policy. Super-state partisans want to forge a homogeneous supranational union with one culture, one ruling establishment, and one set of policies. Confederation advocates want to preserve their own national cultures, establishments and policies, while sharing the benefits of a common market (cherry picking). The myopic institutionalist focus on federalist versus confederative one-track unitary systems has prevented a constructive conversation about the multi-track alternative approach to accommodating both factions within a shared framework. The task of devising a union-preserving multi-track consensus satisfactory to all parties is not difficult,

but does require a dry-eyed application of inclusive economic theory (Rosefelde, 2016).

2. Main Text

2.1. *One-Track Supranationalism*

Nation states before World War II never voluntarily surrendered control over their fiscal, monetary, financial, legal, defense, education, social and foreign policy as part of a package to achieve common goals, even though they participated in international institutions like the League of Nations. It never occurred to most European leaders to create a supranational government to harmonize the needs of individual states with the collective democratic will of all Europe's peoples. The horrors of WWII, combined with cold war politics and the welfare state tide, however, propelled Europe along a novel supranational trajectory without a lucid understanding of the possibilities. On September 19, 1946 Winston Churchill gave a speech in Zurich not only advocating Franco-German rapprochement, but a kind of United States of Europe called a European "Third Way." Churchill can be considered the EU's founder. He also advocated a "Council of Europe" formed thereafter with the assistance of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, mandated to create supranational communities on the path to a fully democratic, integrated Union.¹ The Schuman Declaration May 9, 1950 reaffirmed the concept in conjunction with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS). It proclaimed the European Community as the world's first supranational institution, marking the "birth of modern Europe," and initiating an epoch where intra-European wars were said to be impossible.²

Schuman's utopian vision, traceable back to France's first socialist Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) [On the Reorganization of European Industry, 1814] was the prelude to a succession of transitional developments culminating in today's European Union. The transition took place in nine steps:

¹ The term supranational community was coined by Jean Monnet, Head of France's General Planning Commission.

² In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for having "contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy, and human rights in Europe."

- 1) European Economic Community (EEC), known as the Common Market (1958),
- 2) European Community (1967) [together with the European Commission and the European Council of Ministers],
- 3) European Council (1974), the European Monetary System (1979),
- 4) European Parliament (1979),
- 5) Schengen Agreement (1985) which opened intra-union borders,
- 6) Single Market Act (1986),
- 7) Maastricht Treaty (1993) founding the European Union (EU),³
- 8) European Monetary Union (2002), which inaugurated the euro,
- 9) Lisbon Treaty (2009) which created a single legal entity,⁴ with a permanent President of the European Council, and a strong High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.⁵

Membership in Churchill's and Schuman's "one-track" club was open to any European nation willing to participate in a supranational community on the path

³ The European Union's seven principal decision-making bodies are the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Auditors.

⁴The term three pillars refer to 1) Economic, social and environmental policies performed by the European Community (EC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, until its expiry in 2002), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); 2) Foreign policy and military under the jurisdiction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and 3) Judicial and police matters undertaken Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM).

⁵ The military of the European Union comprises the various cooperative structures that have been established between the armed forces of the member states, both intergovernmentally and within the institutional framework of the union; the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) branch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The policy area of defence is principally the domain of nation states. The main military alliance in Europe remains the intergovernmental North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which presently includes 22 EU member states together with 4 non-EU European countries, Albania, Iceland, Turkey and Norway, as well as the United States and Canada. The development of the CSDP with regard to the existing role of NATO is a contentious issue. The military form of European integration has however intensified in the beginning of the 21st century, bringing about the deployment of numerous CSDP operations and the establishment of EU battle groups. The latter have however never been engaged in operations, and other, recent examples of military integration, such as the European corps, gendarmerie force and air transport command, are intergovernmental, and outside the institutional framework of the union.

to discovering whether the group could devise a satisfactory fully democratic federal entity based on a single comprehensive set of rules uniformly applied to all participants. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, signatories to the 1958 Treaty of Rome are the EU's founding fathers, and remain core supporters of "more Europe".

Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the founders in 1973. The British and Danish publics were sceptical of one-track supranationalism from the outset. Their leaders were attracted to the economic benefits of tariff elimination in a common market, but were more ambivalent about deeper economic and political integration including subsequent monetary union, proposals for supranational regulation fiscal, political, social, juridical, police, foreign affairs and defense matters. Britain and Denmark refused to join the Eurozone.

Greece and Spain became EU members in the 1980s, both aware of efforts to construct a European monetary union, open borders (Schengen agreement) and create a "single market". They and the fifteen other countries that joined after the Soviet Union's demise primarily sought economic benefits, but also agreed to explore the one-track federative possibilities urged by the founding six. The ideal consensus one-track supranational union uniformly binding on all participants however remains as elusive today as it was at the outset of the project. What are the characteristics of an ideal all-union "one-track" trans-nationalized culture? Who will rule the EU at the end of the day? Will supranational Europe be hegemonic behind a nominally democratic mask?

2.2. Supranationalism Re-envisioned

The one-track concept of supranationality is an historical artefact, not a logical imperative. There is no reason why individual EU states must abide by a single set of comprehensive centrally administrated rules (Rosefielde, 2016a,b). The "center" (Brussels and Berlin) can adopt a multi-track control regime that establishes common rules for some activities like the common market, and separate group rules for other issues such as refugee migration within the Schengen Accord in two or more clusters (Rosefielde, 2018a). It already does so in the case of the Eurozone, even though it hopes that all members will eventually adopt the euro as their official currency. Under this alternative multi-track supranational concept, all EU members would be part of the a centrally administered club in some areas where there is a consensus like standardize

environmental regulation, but would be free to form clusters favouring “more Europe” or “less Europe” in others. Those in the “more Europe” membership category could adopt a common fiscal, monetary and banking regime; those in the “less Europe” membership basket could retain their own fiscal, monetary and banking systems (Rosefielde, 2016b). The “more Europe” faction could select free intra-bloc labor migration, and the “less Europe” cluster could impose quotas (Grabbe, Heather and Stefan Lehne, 2017).

Multi-track supranationalism would reduce discord because the scheme is pluralist and tolerant. It accepts diversity and eschews conformity. Moreover, the approach is compatible with democracy at multiple levels. The European electorate might well prefer it, and it could reflect the will of people forming each of the multiple tracks. Conflict is possible. The majority of all EU voters might prefer a regime that is incompatible with the democratic will of one or more member states. For example, the EU electorate may favour refugee sharing, but Hungarian and Polish voters might reject it. Disputes of these sorts require negotiated settlements, and if negotiations fail, some members may choose to exit. No human institution can amicably resolve irreconcilable differences.

Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels thought otherwise. They insisted that central authorities having criminalized private property, the market and entrepreneurship could optimally plan communal production and distribution to everyone satisfaction even though systems directors lacked detailed knowledge of private preferences (Rosefielde, 2018b). By analogy, “one-track” EU supranationalists contend that Brussels and Berlin can arrange rules and policies empowering all EU members to maximize their utility, but communist experience belies the supposition. Individuals and majorities in EU member states and clusters often believe that they are better off doing things their own way, rather than obeying supranational masters. One-track supranationalism is bedevilled by the same harmonist fallacy that undid communism. Its architects wrongly suppose that there is a one-track EU-wide supranational regime that is incontestably best for all concerned as the people themselves evaluate things, but this cannot be so because members have different preferences, and Brussels and Berlin refuse to accommodate those who disagree.

Two level planning sheds further light on the conflict (Kornai and Liptak, 1965; Dantzig and Wolffe, 1960). Communist central planners were responsible for national production, but recognized that enterprise managers had a superior grasp of their firms’ production possibilities. Mathematical programmers

therefore devised two level planning algorithms that allowed enterprise managers to compute production with full knowledge of national intentions. They in turn provided decentralized results to the central authorities, who used the information to perfect the national plan (Rosefielde, 2007). The iterative process allowed the central authorities to achieve their goals more efficiently, but they did not go the next step. They did not integrate consumer preferences into the central planners' objective function. One-track supranationality improves EU performance in the restricted two-level planning sense. It increases productivity and utility when there is a shared one-track objective function by better harnessing resources to a common transnational ends, but does not maximize EU welfare when the preferences of individuals and multi-track member clusters deviate from those of the central authorities. What counts in the final analysis is not the technical efficiency of a one-track regime. It is the community's heterogeneous perception of its wellbeing that should be the litmus test for any supranational EU system.

2.3. Inclusive Economic Theory

The wellbeing of the EU community depends inclusively on three factors: the private sector, public programs and external economies. These factors subsume standard performance indicators like per capita income, growth, employment, national indebtedness, inequality, democracy and social justice. Each component of the trilogy contributes to the whole. Activities in the private sector generate household utility by connecting employment, earned income, retail sales to personal consumption. Consumers are supposed to be sovereign in this sphere, and there is no role for supranationality unless markets are imperfectly competitive. Public programs modify household utility through taxes and transfers, the provision of public goods, controls, regulations, executive orders and mandates to achieve diverse social objectives such as entitlements, affirmative action, restorative justice and egalitarianism. Externalities, both positive and negative derive from experiences beyond individual control in the private and public spheres (Coase, 1960, Rosefielde, S. – Pfouts, R, 2014). Conditions of labor, collegiality, social relations, solidarity, culture, immigration, domestic and international relations, national security, mass psychology and the environment all may supplement or detract from household utility, and hence wellbeing.

EU supranationality affects these spheres differently. It increases the efficiency of factor allocation, production and distribution in the private sector (Common Market) when market size is circumscribed and competitiveness incomplete. It effects collective goods and transfers in the public sector, and Europe's ability to capture positive externalities and eradicate negative ones. Sometimes transnationality alters attitudes toward work, and productivity; other times it benefits or harms specific individual and groups. Sometimes it improves social relations, other times it worsens them.

EU leaders claim credit for gains in all three components of wellbeing. They are proud of creating the Single Market which eliminates barriers to trade, increases labor mobility and liberalizes finance in the private sector. They tout their sponsorship of privatization, liberalization, entrepreneurship and competitiveness, and assert that monetary union spurred rapid economic catch up among the bloc's less developed members during the early years of the new millennium.

They are equally proud of promoting union-wide improvements in public assistance, education, health, environmental, welfare, judicial and defense programs, and Berlin claims credit for financially supporting debtor countries like Greece (Rosefielde and Liu, 2018). EU spokespersons likewise contend that supranationality contributed to the union's wellbeing by ushering in an era of peace, and establishing a progressive, democratic, humanitarian, and just culture.

These claims are credible because the scope of the EU's supranational authority over three competencies is vast:

Exclusive Control

1) the "customs union," 2) competition policy, 3) Eurozone (EZ) monetary power, 4) a common fisheries policy, 5) a common commercial policy, 6) conclusion of certain international agreements,

Shared Control

7) the internal market, 8) social policy for aspects defined in the treaty, 9) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources, 10) environment, 11) consumer protection, 12) transport, 13) trans-European networks, 14) energy, 15) the area of freedom, security and justice, 16) common safety concerns in public health aspects defined in the treaty, 17) research, development, technology and space, 18) development, cooperation

and humanitarian aid, 19) coordination of economic and social policies, 20) common security and defense policies.

Supportive Authority

21) protection and improvement of human health, 22) industry, 23) culture,

24) tourism, 25) education, youth sport and vocational training, 26) civil protection

(disaster prevention), and 27) administration.

Few deny that the EU has many supranational accomplishments to its credit. These achievements provide a solid foundation for common one-track supranational management. Frictions nonetheless exist within the EU because some members are dissatisfied with the status quo. Some want to rollback parts of the consensus and others want to expand them. Neither side can impose its will on the other in a one-track regime without raising the spectre of secession. Opponents of fiscal centralization refuse accept supranational control over national budgets, even if this is undertaken in baby steps. Accommodation however is possible in an inclusive multi-track system. Advocates of “More Europe” can expand “exclusive” supranational competence by including some “shared” and “supporting” competencies (including fiscal centralization). Champions of “Less Europe” reciprocally can contract the scope of “exclusive”, “shared” and “supportive” competencies (including exiting the Eurozone) depending on their judgments about wellbeing. Both groups have infinite degrees of freedom in finding common ground in a two-track scheme, and should subgroups emerge additional tracks can accommodate their needs.⁶

Voltaire’s adage that “the best is the enemy of the good” applies to the multi-track option.⁷ It is unwise for advocates of the super-state to force their fanciful one-track dream of “more Europe” on those who cannot abide the consequences. It wise for practical men of affairs to acknowledge that one size may not fit all; that a pluralist half-a-loaf is likely to be better than none, and construct a “satisficing” multi-track supranational Europe without utopian illusions (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Kahneman, 2003; Simon 1957).

⁶ The multi-track approach outlined above is not restricted to supranationalism. It can apply in a single nation, community or family where participants abide by some common rules, but are also free to maximize their wellbeing as they choose in their separate domains.

⁷ Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), "La Bégueule" in *Contes (Tales)*, 1772. "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien".

When the best is unattainable and striving for it is counter-productive. Statespersons should avoid the “nirvana fallacy” (Demsetz, 1969),⁸ and content themselves with the “good”.⁹

3. Conclusions

The construction of the European Union from the outset has been a joint venture between utopian idealists inspired by Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon,¹⁰ and men of affairs attracted to the centralization of power in the European space. Each favours the creation of a comprehensive one-track supranational regime. However, they disagree about the attributes of the ideal, and are reluctant to consider a practical multi-track supranational second best alternative (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956; Rosefielde, 2015). They are likely to persist, but would be better advised to heed Voltaire by re-envisioning the EU as a democratic alliance that is content with a good working relationship acceptable to all parties instead of insisting on the establishment of an unattainable supranational best (Tirole, 2015; Rosefielde and Liu 2017, Thaler, 2015).

⁸Harold Demsetz, "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint", *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 12, issue 1, 1969, pp. 1-22. "The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing "imperfect" institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements".

⁹ ASEAN faces a similar dilemma. It cannot respond effectively to China's challenge because its policies must be adopted by consensus. This means that a single ASEAN member influenced by China can thwart the majority's will. A multi-track supranational regime would break the stalemate. See Richard Javad Heydarian , "Time For ASEAN Minilateralism", *RSIS*, No. 210/2017 dated 7 November 2017.

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CO17210.pdf?utm_source=getresponse&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=rsis_publications&utm_content=RSIS+Commentary+210%2F2017+Time+For+ASEAN+Minilateralism+by+Richard+Javad+Heydarian

¹⁰M. Le Comte de Saint-Simon, *De la Reorganization de la Societe Europeenne* (Paris, 1814). Anca Simitopol, "The European Union Project of Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon: between Utopian Imagination and Technocratic Reality," *Sfera Politicii*. 2014;XXII(3 (179)):66-75

References

- [1] Coase, R. (1960): The Problem of Social Cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3 (1): 1–44.
- [2] Dallago, B. (2016a): Europhoria and its Aftermath. In: Rosefielde, S. (ed.): *Western Economic Stagnation and Social Turmoil: Lessons for Asia*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishers.
- [3] Dallago, B. (2016b): The Crisis, the Monetary Union, and Migration. In: Dallago, B. – McGowan, J. (eds): *Crises in Europe in the Transatlantic Context: Economic and Political Appraisals*. London: Routledge, pp.1-18.
- [4] Dallago, B. (2016c): Eurozone: from Distress to Deeper Integration?, In: Dallago, B. – McGowan, J. (eds): *Crises in Europe in the Transatlantic Context: Economic and Political Appraisals*. London: Routledge, pp.51-68.
- [5] Dallago, B. (2018): The Progressive Rift of the Eurozone: Risks and Remedies. *Singapore Economic Review*.
- [6] Dallago, B. – Guri, G. – McGowan, J. (2016): *A Global Perspective on the European Economic Crisis*. London: Routledge.
- [7] Dallago, B. - Rosefielde, S. (2018): The strange fate of Brexit and Grexit and the Eurozone Integration and disintegration, *Contemporary Economics*.
- [8] Dantzig, G - Wolfe, P. (1960): Decomposition Principle for Linear Programs, *Operations Research*, 101-111.
- [9] Demsetz, H. (1969): Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 12 (1): 1-22.
- [10] Dorfman, R. – Samuelson, P. – Solow, R. Fleming, M. (1958): *Linear Programming and Economic Analysis*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- [11] European Commission, *Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union*, Brussels: European Commission COM, 2017. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paperemu_en.pdf
- [12] European Union, The Rome Declaration, Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, Brussels: European Council, 2017. European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, Brussels: European Commission COM, 2017. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paperemu_en.pdf European Union, The Rome Declaration. Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, Brussels: European Council, 2017.
- [13] Gigerenzer, G. – Selten, R. (2002): *Bounded Rationality*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- [14] Grabbe, Heather and Stefan Lehne, “Defending EU Values in Poland and Hungary”, *Carnegie Europe*, September 04, 2017. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/09/04/defending-eu-values-in-poland-and-hungarypub-72988>
- [15] Gretschnann, K. (2016): The EU in Stormy Seas: Beginning of the End or End of the Beginning. In: Dallago, B. – Guri, G. – McGowan, J. (eds): *A Global Perspective on the European Economic Crisis*. London: Routledge, Chapter 3, pp.33-47.
- [16] Kahneman, D. (2003): Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics. *The American Economic Review*, 93(5): 1449–1475.
- [17] Kornai, J - Liptak, T. (1965) : Two-level Planning, *Econometrica*, 1965, 33: 141 - 169.

- [18] Lipsey, R - Lancaster, K. (1956): The General Theory of Second Best. *Review of Economic Studies*, 24 (1), 11–32.
- [19] Piattoni, S. (2016): Institutional Innovations and EU Legitimacy after the Crisis. In: Dallago, B. – McGowan, J.: *Crises in Europe in the Transatlantic Context: Economic and Political Appraisals*. London: Routledge, pp.119-136.
- [20] Rosefielde, S. (2007): *Russian Economy from Lenin to Putin*. New York: Wiley.
- [21] Rosefielde, S. (2015): Economic Theory of the Second Worst. *Higher School of Economics Journal (HSE)*, (Moscow), 19 (1) 30–44.
- [22] Rosefielde, S. (2016a): The European Project: Moving Forward with Dry Eyes. In: Dallago, B. – Guri, G. – McGowan, J. (eds): *A Global Perspective on the European Economic Crisis*. London: Routledge, pp. 21–32.
- [23] Rosefielde, S. (2016b): Grexit and Brexit: Rational Choice, Compatibility, and Coercive Adaptation. *Acta Oeconomica*, September, 77-91.
- [24] Rosefielde, S. (2018a): Salvaging the EU: Two Speed or Dual-Track Reform?”. *Contemporary Economics*.
- [25] Rosefielde, S. (2018b): Communism: Failed Dystopian Experiment in the Economics of Control, paper presented at the conference on “100 Years of Communist Experiments”, University of Maryland, College Park, November 16-17, 2017.
- [26] Rosefielde, S - Liu, Y. (2017): Sovereign Debt Crises: Solidarity and Power. *The Journal of Comparative Economic Studies*, 12: 101-112.
- [27] Rosefielde, S - Liu, Y. (2018): Local Public Debt Management: Lessons from Greece in Inclusive Economic Perspective, *Singapore Economic Review*.
- [28] Rosefielde, S. – Pfouts, R.W. (2014): *Inclusive Economic Theory*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishers.
- [29] Simon, H. A. (1957): *Models of Man: Social and Rational – Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- [30] Thaler, Richard, “Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics”, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2015.
- [31] Tirole, J. (2015): Country Solidarity in Sovereign Crises. *American Economic Review*, 105(8): 2333–2363.